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The authors employ a novel dataset on almost 30,000 
trade credit contracts to describe the broad characteristics 
of the parties that contract together; the key contractual 
terms, such as the discount for early payment; and the 
days by when payment is due. Whereas prior work has 
typically used information on only one side of the buyer-
seller transaction, this paper utilizes information on both. 
This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of 
a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at lklapper@worldbank.org. 
The authors find that the largest and most creditworthy 
buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities from 
smaller suppliers, with the latter extending credit to the 
former perhaps as a way of certifying product quality. 
Discounts for early payment seem to be offered to riskier 
buyers to limit the potential nonpayment risk when 
credit is extended for non-financial reasons.  
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1.  Introduction 
Trade credit is an important source of external financing for firms of all sizes (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2005).  For instance, suppliers often offer working capital financing to their 
buyers, reported as accounts receivables, some of whom may be small or credit constrained 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Marotta, 2005; and Van Horen 2005). Trade credit has also 
been shown to act as a substitute for bank credit during periods of monetary tightening or 
financial crisis (see, for example, Himmelberg et al., 1995; Choi and Kim, 2005; and Love et al., 
2007).  
Trade credit, however, is not used for financing purposes alone. Trade credit, it has been 
argued, is a way for a supplier to engage in price discrimination, giving favored or more 
powerful clients longer terms (see, for example, Wilner, 2000; Fisman and Raturi, 2004; Van 
Horen, 2005; and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011).  Furthermore, trade credit may 
simply be customary in an industry, with customs driven by economic rationales such as 
allowing buyers time to assess the quality of the supplied goods (Lee and Stowe, 1993). 
  Studies have explored the supply and demand of trade credit around the world (for 
instance, Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Boissay and Gropp, 
2007; and Fabbri and Klapper, 2009).  Yet, in part due to the lack of detailed contract-level data 
on trade credit terms, little is known about how the contract terms of trade credit vary across 
buyer and supplier characteristics. For example, what is the typical contract period of trade 
credit? Which buyers receive longer net days (days before payment is due)? Which firms are 
offered early payment discounts?  
 This paper addresses these questions using a unique database that includes contract 
information for about 30,000 supplier transactions for 56 large buyers in the United States and 
Europe.  The data includes detailed information on contract terms:  the contract size (the amount 
in trade credit to spend in U.S. dollars), net days (days within which the buyer has to pay the 
amount owed), discount days (days within which the buyer has to pay to get the full discount), 
discount rate (the size of the discount if the amount is paid by the discount date), and the 
currency of the transaction.   3 
What really sets our dataset apart from the earlier survey based work, however, is that our 
data has bilateral contract information, allowing us to control both for buyer and supplier firm 
characteristics and analyze both sides of the buyer-seller transaction, whereas earlier work only 
analyzed one side of the buyer-seller transaction. An equally important distinction with 
previously used survey data is that we have multiple contracts for the same buyer and supplier 
firms, rather than a firm-average response. This allows us to include firm fixed effects in our 
empirical analysis, thereby correcting for time-invariant firm characteristics that might determine 
the choice of credit terms.  
The limitations of our data set are that the number of buyers is small (a total of 56), which 
limits our analysis of buyer characteristics, and that we have relatively little information about 
the sellers in our sample. For example, we do not have information on the industry of the seller. 
Unfortunately, we have no way of getting more data. Because our buyers are mostly large firms 
we are less likely to pick up the financing motive as strongly as in earlier work (although we do 
have a mix of investment and non-investment grade buyers), but this allows us to focus on other 
non-financing motives.  
We start by summarizing typical trade credit contracts terms, such as number of discount 
days, discount rate, and net days, and analyze how they relate to buyer and seller characteristics. 
We then turn to analysis.  We argue that while it seems hard to conclude that trade credit is 
primarily a cheap way for suppliers to provide buyers financing in our sample (most of our 
buyers are larger and better rated than our suppliers, and still get credit), non-financing motives 
seem to be operative. In particular, large, investment-grade buyers get long terms from small 
suppliers. We believe this is consistent with relatively untrusted suppliers extending longer terms 
to buyers to guarantee product quality. However, this leaves suppliers exposed to riskier credits. 
This is where discounts help. Riskier buyers are offered discounts to repay early so that suppliers 
can offer warranties about the quality of the product supplied even while containing the credit 
risk in their trade credit portfolio.  
The paper continues as follows. In section 2 we review theories of trade credit, and we 
describe our data set in section 3. In section 4, we present the empirical results, and we conclude 
in section 5.   4 
2.  Theories of Trade Credit 
Before we present the data, it might be useful to outline various theories of trade credit. Much of 
the work on trade credit has seen it as a form of financing that can overcome traditional 
impediments in financing. In particular, the seller may know more about, and have more clout 
over, the buyer than other arm‘s length financiers (see, for example, Smith, 1987; Brennan et al., 
1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Biais and Gollier, 1997; and Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
Therefore trade credit may be available when other forms of financing are not. Much of this 
literature argues that large, high credit quality suppliers have a comparative advantage in 
obtaining outside finance and pass on this advantage to small, credit constrained buyers (e.g., 
Boissay and Gropp, 2007). Similarly, large suppliers may act also as liquidity providers, insuring 
buyers against liquidity shocks that could endanger their survival (see, for example, Cunat, 2006). 
They may also be better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default, generating 
demand for trade credit from credit constrained buyers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Fabbri 
and Menichini, 2010). Or, as in Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), receivables may be used as 
collateral for bank credit, improving the buyer and supplier‘s combined access to finance. 
Nevertheless, previous studies and our own also suggest that trade credit is not only used 
to finance credit constrained firms.
1 For instance, large, listed, multinational firms around the 
world, which are unlikely to face financing constraints in the market, hold large volumes of 
accounts payable on their balance sheet (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005).  Globally, 
it is estimated that trade credit financed 90% of world merchandise trade in 2007, valued at about 
US$ 25 trillion dollars.
2 
Why might large, investment grade buyers choose to use trade credit financing? Perhaps 
their suppliers have even cheaper access to financing, and a comparative advantage in passing it 
on (see Ng et al., 1999).   However, many suppliers in our data set are much smaller than their 
buyers, and are unlikely to have access to cheaper financing.     
                                                            
1 In fact, Schiff and Lieber (1974) argue that risk management and inventory management decisions are often taken 
separately from financing decisions and by different units of the firm, and that consequently trade credit cannot be 
solely explained on financing grounds. 
2 ―World Bank urged to lift trade credit finance,‖ Financial Times, November 11, 2008.   5 
An alternative explanation is that large buyers have the market power to extract favorable 
contract terms, which reduce their overall borrowing costs (see, for example, Giannetti, Burkart, 
and Ellingsen, 2011; and Fabbri and Klapper, 2009). Why small suppliers may want to borrow at 
high cost in order to provide such cheap financing seems less clear – could they not simply offer 
more of a price discount up front, without incurring the deadweight costs of intermediation? One 
reason may be that a country‘s laws may not allow a vendor to offer different prices to different 
clients.
 3 To the extent that price discrimination is prohibited, variations in trade credit terms also 
offer opportunities for sellers to offer better terms to more important suppliers (e.g., Brennan et 
al., 1988).  The market power explanation does suggest possible variation in contractual terms 
also: To the extent that a buyer is more creditworthy than a supplier and enjoys lower financing 
costs, he should prefer to obtain discounts for early payment (effectively, a price discount) rather 
than longer term financing.   
Another non-financial reason for the use of trade credit is for the supplier to warranty 
product quality to the buyer. To the extent that the buyer does not have to pay for a good until he 
has used or sold it satisfactorily, it allows him time to verify the quality of the good before 
deciding whether or not to make payment and accept the merchandise (see, for example, Lee and 
Stowe, 1993; Long et al., 1993; and Antras and Foley, 2011). The time that buyers need to verify 
quality may then determine the duration of trade credit. For instance, perishable goods bought by 
small suppliers may take a relatively short time to verify. In contrast, durable goods bought by 
cross-border large buyers, who take more time to distribute to their outlets, may require longer 
payment terms.
4 
Finally, given non-financial reasons for extending trade credit, financial risk management 
might dictate at the margin what terms are set. For instance, suppliers may be more willing to 
trust large investment grade buyers with longer terms. Trade credit terms can also be set by 
suppliers as a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk (see, for example, Mian and 
Smith, 1992; and Frank and Maksimovic, 2005). In particular, sellers can reduce payment risks 
                                                            
3 For example, the Clayton Act in the US prohibits price discrimination across customers for the same good. 
4 Of course, a supplier who is in a repeated relationship with a buyer may have incentives to deliver quality. Even so, 
trade credit could save on transactions costs, with the buyer paying only for what meets the quality hurdle (or the 
time specified for sales as in consignment sales).    6 
through two-part payment terms, such as early payment discounts to incentivize buyers to pay 
early (e.g., Ng et al., 1999).  
In sum then, we see three important factors driving trade credit: 1) As a way for suppliers 
with cheaper access to credit to finance buyers; 2) As a means for the buyer to exercise market 
power and obtain favorable price discrimination; and 3) As a warranty assuring buyers of 
product quality. Given these three factors, terms may be influenced by the supplier‘s need to 
contain financial risks.  
Our data set is unique in that we know some characteristics of the parties on either side of 
the contract. So we can take a closer look at these rationales for trade credit, focusing on how 
contract terms vary with characteristics of the parties to the contract. The limitations of our data 
set are that we do not have detailed characteristics on the firms, and we have no way of getting 
more data. Therefore our tests are reduced-form in nature, allowing us to document associations 
but not identify causality. Nevertheless, what we can tease out is intriguing. 
3.  Data, Summary Statistics, and Variance Decomposition Analysis 
We use a novel database of trade credit contracts for nearly the universe of suppliers of 56 large 
buyers.
5 The data are provided by PrimeRevenue, an online network that links large, global 
companies, their suppliers, and third-party financial institutions, via the Internet.  PrimeRevenue 
provides software and an IT platform for buyers to post their invoices directly. Suppliers choose 
whether to be paid at the maturity of the contract or to have the contract ―factored out‖ and be 
paid immediately at a discount. PrimeRevenue is a leading provider of such ―open platform 
supply-chain finance (SCF)‖ solutions, allowing multiple banks to participate directly in a 
buyer‘s SCF program. 
The buyers in our dataset are PrimeRevenue‘s clients. The data on the suppliers is 
collected from the buyers, who hold extensive information on their suppliers, including detailed 
information on their trade credit contracts. The suppliers sell mostly final goods (only 1% of 
                                                            
5 Because purchasing history is proprietary information, we do not know the identity of buyers in our sample.  
However, as discussed in this section, PrimeRevenue provided us with buyer characteristics (such as size, sector, 
and location) and informed us that almost all buyers in our sample are Global Fortune 500 companies.   7 
contracts are from sellers that produce intermediate goods), indicating that the buyers are mostly 
at the end of the value chain. 
Our data is a snapshot of outstanding receivables as of December 1, 2005.  Importantly, 
this snapshot is before PrimeRevenue started factoring the receivables.
6 Also, PrimeRevenue 
allows firms to post whatever trade credit contract they choose, and does not limit the choice to a 
set of standardized options for firms. Buyers generally post invoices for all ‗important‘ suppliers, 
which is estimated by PrimeRevenue to capture over 90% of total inputs to the buyer.  Our 
database includes information for 29,019 contracts, the full set of contracts in PrimeRevenue at 
the time, which includes 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. The data includes complete 
information on contract terms:  the contract size, net days, discount days, discount, and currency 
in which the contract is denominated. Most buyers interact with most sellers only once, though 
there is a fraction of repeat buyers and sellers who have multiple buyers. 
For buyers, we can control for firm size using buckets based on their total sales
7, location 
(North America or Europe), sector, and whether the buyer is investment grade.  For suppliers, we 
know their size (sales buckets) and whether the supplier is investment grade.  Information is not 
provided on supplier location or sector, since 95% of buyers purchase inputs via local 
distribution centers to avoid any import duties, such as tariffs and taxes. Apart from missing 
information about net days for 832 out of 29,019 contracts, we have complete information on 
contract terms. 
Empirical work on trade credit thus far has been hampered due to a lack of firm-level data 
on trade credit contract terms. Most studies have used the Federal Reserve‘s Survey of Small 
Business Finances (SSBF) database of U.S. firms, which has only limited data on credit terms 
and firm characteristics (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Giannetti et al., 2011). Ng et al. 
(1999), instead, uses survey level data on 950 listed U.S. firms to study the determinants and 
characteristics of trade credit contracts.  
                                                            
6 Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain repeated cross-sections or panels of data from Prime Revenue, because 
these are proprietary data. We obtained a single snapshot of data for the year 2005, prior to Prime Revenue starting 
factoring the receivables in 2006. 
7 Buyer and supplier size buckets based on total sales are (in U.S. dollars): less than $0.1 billion; $0.1-2 billion; $2-7 
billion; $7-10 billion; larger than $10 billion.   8 
Our dataset differs from ones used in the earlier survey based work by Ng et al. (1999), 
Giannetti et al. (2011) and others in several important ways. First, we use data from actual trade 
credit contracts rather than data based on survey responses, thereby mitigating the usual 
misreporting concerns associated with survey based data. Importantly, our dataset consists of 
trade credit contracts signed, while papers using the National Survey of Small Business Finance 
(NSSBF) database use trade credit contracts offered. Our dataset also covers a broader set of 
industries that includes technology firms, allowing for an analysis of trade credit contract terms 
across a broader range of industries, and includes trade credit terms not only for U.S. firms but 
also for international firms, allowing for a comparison of trade credit terms across different 
jurisdictions. Moreover, our dataset covers suppliers of all sizes, and not just small firms as in 
the SSBF. This is an important difference because the credit terms offered by large firms could 
be very different than those by small firms.  
We begin by summarizing the main characteristics of buyers, suppliers, and contracts.  
Panels A and B of Table 1 show summary statistics of buyer and supplier characteristics.  First, 
the buyers in our sample are very large – 33 out of 56 (or 59%) of buyers have over US$ 10 
billion in sales and only one buyer has less than US$ 2 billion in sales.   
The buyers are also creditworthy as measured by whether or not they are investment 
grade – about 75% of buyers in the dataset are investment grade.  That we have mostly large, 
investment-grade buyers will make it harder to find evidence in this dataset of a financing motive 
for trade credit. We should, therefore, treat our results with appropriate caution. 
Buyers are active in a range of industries, with the majority in retail industries. The 
sectoral distribution of buyers is: 16% in auto manufacturing, 13% in diversified retail, 29% in 
diversified manufacturing, 7% in retail groceries, 16% in retail hard goods, 11% in retail soft 
goods, 5% in technology, 4% in food and beverages, and 2% in the utility sector. The data 
encompasses only one firm in the utility sector and two firms in the food and beverages sector.  
Approximately 77% of buyers are from North America (the U.S. or Canada) and 23% of buyers 
are from Europe.  
In comparison to the buyers, our suppliers are relatively small: 56% of suppliers have less 
than US$ 100 million in sales and only 11% of suppliers have more than US$ 2 billion in sales.   9 
Creditworthiness is also an issue for many suppliers, given that almost two-thirds of suppliers are 
not investment grade (meaning their credit rating is below investment grade or they do not have a 
rating).  
In Table 1, Panel C, we present summary statistics of contract characteristics.  We have a 
wide distribution of contract amounts (contract size) varying from about US$ 400 dollars to over 
US$ 4 billion dollars, with a median of about US$ 3.5 million dollars.
8 Contracts in our sample 
are generally very long in duration – the average net days is 59.2 and the median is 60 net days.  
About 75% of contracts in our sample have net days longer than 30 days, which is longer than 
the ‗typical‘ contract of 30 days previously shown in the literature (Ng, Smith and Smith 1999), 
possibly because our buyers are relatively large.  For example, 20% of contracts have net days of 
exactly 30 days, 28% have net days of exactly 60 days, and 17% have net days of exactly 75 
days. 
About 60% of contracts in our sample are denominated in U.S. dollars, followed by 
almost 40% in euros; this is in line with the distribution of contracts among buyers in Europe and 
North America (41% and 59%, respectively, as shown in Table 1, Panel A). 
In our sample, 13% of contracts (or 3,707 in total) offer early payment discounts.
9  We 
also examine the discount terms, including the discount and discount days (the number of days 
within which the buyer has to pay to obtain the discount).  Almost two-thirds of discount days 
are 30 days or less, while 27% are between 30 and 60 days, and 9% are more than 60 days.  
Some terms seem very common; 20% of discount days are 10 days, 20% are 30 days, and 16% 
are 60 days.  The most common spreads of net days less discount days are 1 day (34% of 
contracts with discounts), 30 days (29% of contracts), and 20 days (16% of contracts), with the 
majority (or 63%) of contracts having a spread of net days less discount days equal to or less 
than 20 days.  The mean spread of net days less discount days equals 17 and the mean ratio of 
discount to net days is 63%.  
                                                            
8 The largest contract in our dataset is for a large, diversified U.S. retailer. 
9 This is a comparable figure to that obtained using SSBF survey data on U.S. firms, indicating that 20% of firms 
that use trade credit are offered an early payment discount from their suppliers.   10 
That 30% of contracts have a spread of exactly one day might suggest that discounts can 
be used simply to encourage prompt payments, or as an implicit price discount, i.e. an alternative 
to a cut in list prices.
10 The mean and median discount rate is equal to 2%. Of contracts with 
discounts, 36% have a discount equal to 1% or less, 56% have a discount of 2% or less but 
exceeding 1%, and the remaining 8% have a discount greater than 2%.  
Trade credit appears expensive for most buyers. The effective interest rate, defined as the 
implied interest rate if the buyer does not pay on the discount date, foregoes the discount, and 
pays on the due date, is   1 ) 1 ( 1
) /( 360  
 days discount days net rate discount . The average effective 
interest rate is high at 53%, though effective interest rates vary from a low of 2% to a high of 
100%. 
In Table 2, we show the distribution of contracts and buyers across buyer and supplier 
characteristics, indicating that the sample is well distributed across firms of different sizes and 
investment grade ratings. For example, while the majority of buyers are investment grade, there 
are still 14 (out of 56) firms that are not investment grade. 
In Table 3 we present the distribution of contract terms by buyer and supplier 
characteristics.  Larger buyers tend to make purchases with a wider range of contract size, 
including more frequent relatively small purchases of less than US$ 1 million in size.  Across 
industries, auto manufacturing and retail hard goods have relatively larger average contract size, 
especially relative to technology, where almost 75% of contracts are less than US$ 1 million in 
size.  We find no notable differences in contract size across buyer location or investment grade.  
In addition, large suppliers appear to make large sales, while whether a supplier is investment 
grade or not does not seem related to average contract size. 
Contracts to the largest and most creditworthy buyers also entail longer maturities (net 
days). We find strong sectoral effects in the net days offered:  85% of contracts in retailing of 
soft goods have a maturity of 30 days or less, while other sectors have longer average maturities.   
Contracts to firms in Europe are on average longer than contracts in North America (although the 
sectoral distribution is relatively even across regions).   
                                                            
10 Anecdotally, large buyers do not pay late fees to their suppliers.   11 
Next, we focus on the decision to extend early payment discounts (Table 4). Statistics 
refer to the subsample of contracts that offer an early payment discount. Overall, 34 out of the 56 
buyers (or 63% of buyers) are offered at least one early payment discount.  In general, the buyers 
receiving a discount are small and non-investment grade, while suppliers offering a discount tend 
to be larger and are roughly equally likely to be investment or non-investment grade.  Suppliers 
are also most likely to offer discounts to buyers that retail in hard goods. 22 buyers are never 
offered discounts (including all buyers in the food and beverages, technology, and utility sectors). 
In the empirical analysis of this paper we therefore also check how the results look if we drop the 
firms who never report discounts. 
Discounts do not appear strongly related to buyer or supplier characteristics, with the 
exception that higher discounts (>2%) are more common in the auto industry and among grocery 
firms.  Discount days, the number of days the buyer has to pay and receive a discount, appears 
strongly related to buyer size – 78% of firms with less than US$ 10 billion in total sales have 
discount days of 30 or less, while only about 64% of firms larger than US$ 10 billion in size 
receive a short discount window.  The mean of net days is 60 days for contracts without 
discounts and 44 days for contracts with discounts, suggesting that suppliers offer trade discounts 
in association with shorter net days. 
Importantly, our database also allows for both supplier and buyer fixed effects.  About 
25% of suppliers (or 7,273 suppliers) sell to multiple buyers. Of these, 3,126 suppliers sell to 2 
buyers and 4,147 suppliers sell to 3 or more buyers. In addition, 16% of suppliers (or 4,557 
suppliers) have more than one contract with the same buyer. Specifically, 2,685 suppliers have 
exactly 2 contracts with a buyer, and 1,872 suppliers have 3 or more contracts with a buyer.  In 
general, we find variation in net days and the decision to extend an early payment discount 
across contracts of a single supplier. 
The summary statistics and correlation matrix of the main regression variables are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. We find that the correlation between supplier investment grade and 
supplier large size is not high at 0.2, and that the correlation between buyer investment grade and 
buyer large size is close to zero (these calculations treat unrated firms as non-investment grade 
firms because the data do not allow us to distinguish between non-investment grade and unrated).   12 
These low correlations reduce concerns about potential multicollinearity problems in our 
regressions. 
Next, we conduct a variance decomposition analysis of our main outcome variables of 
interest: log of net days, the discount dummy (equal to one if a discount is offered), and the 
effective interest rate. In earlier work, Ng et al. (1999) argue that most of the determinants of 
trade credit contracts are sector driven. The variance decomposition results presented in Table 7, 
Panel A confirm this: net days and discounts (and to lesser extent interest rates) are mainly 
driven by buyer industry characteristics. 
 Of course, the supplier characteristics we have are coarse, and do not include the supplier 
industry. Because the suppliers are smaller and hence likely to be more narrowly focused, their 
industry is likely to carry more information about trade credit terms. One way to explore the 
effect of inclusion of detailed supplier characteristics is to include supplier fixed effects. This 
will allow us to check whether credit terms of a given seller vary across buyers.  Specifically, we 
compute the contribution of buyer characteristics in explaining the variance of contract 
characteristics that remain after controlling for supplier fixed effects, for the sellers with multiple 
contracts. The results are in Table 7, Panel B.  
They show that buyer characteristics explain only a small fraction of the variation in net 
days and interest rates once the variation in credit terms from supplier characteristics has been 
fully accounted for, indicating that the credit terms offered by a given seller do not vary much 
across buyers (and that the narrower seller‘s industry probably subsumes much of the variation in 
the buyer‘s industry). However, buyer industry characteristics remain an important determinant 
of the variation in discounts of a given seller across buyers, even after controlling for supplier 
fixed effects. The results suggest that a seller may offer discounts selectively across buyers, even 
if other terms like the duration of credit may be largely determined by the seller‘s characteristics. 
This willingness to be selective in discounts will be important in our explanation of its purpose. 
4.  Characteristics of Contracting Parties and Regression Analysis  
Let us now examine the determinants of contract terms more explicitly, starting first with the 
explicit duration of contracts, that is, net days.   13 
4.1  Net Days 
In Figure 1, we plot average net days for different sets of supplier-buyer characteristics. Figures 
1a to 1d suggest that large, investment grade buyers get longer net days from smaller suppliers. 
To verify this, we turn to regressions, with log net days as the dependent variable.  
Figure 1: Net Days for Suppliers and Buyers of Different Size and Ratings 
 
We include supplier and buyer characteristics as explanatory variables.  We include an 
indicator if the buyer is large (above $ 10 billion in sales), as well as an indicator if the buyer has 
an investment grade rating. Similarly, we include an indicator if the supplier is large (above $ 2 
billion in sales), an indicator if the supplier is medium sized (between $ 100 million and $ 2 
billion in sales), as well as an indicator if the supplier is investment grade. We also include 
indicators for the buyer‘s industry.    
Our first results are shown in Table 8.  The first two columns cluster standard errors by 
buyer, while the next two columns include buyer fixed effects, and the last two columns include 
supplier fixed effects.  Note that the supplier fixed-effects regressions are identified on the basis 




























































Figure 1c  14 
of contracts. The second columns in each of these pairs excludes credit contracts with discounts, 
so as to correct for the possibility that net days on two-part contracts vary systematically from 
those of simple contracts without discounts – however, the estimates excluding contracts with a 
discount do not seem to be qualitatively different.  
Our industry classifications are very broad. Nevertheless, we find buyers in industries 
with  substantial  turnover  and  where  goods  are  more  likely  to  be  perishable  (groceries,  soft 
goods), tend to have shorter net days. This is consistent with trade credit as a warranty of quality. 
Utilities also tend to have lower net days, which would be consistent with trade credit as a 
warranty if utilities primarily buy fuel, whose quality is easily assessed.
11   
Consistent with Figure 1, we find that longer net days are offered to significantly larger, 
investment grade buyers (Table 8, Columns 1-2).  The magnitude of these effects is sizeable. For 
example, from the estimates in  Column 2, a buyer who is large gets  9.8 longer days than the 
mean of 59 days. Similarly, a buyer who is investment grade gets 7.5 longer days than the mean 
net days.   
We also find that net days are shorter for buyers located in North America (the majority 
of which are located in the US) relative to buyers located in Europe. One potential explanation 
for this result is that sales in Europe are often cross -border in which case buyers may demand 
longer days to protect against damaged goods and avoid having to challenge suppliers in foreign 
courts.   
When we include buyer fixed effects (Table 8, Columns 3 and 4), we find that longer net 
days are significantly more likely to  be extended by smaller suppliers and by investment grade 
suppliers, again consistent with Figure 1. When we include supplier fixed effects (thus focusing 
on the subsample of suppliers with multiple contracts within or across buyers), we continue to 
find that larger and investment grade buyers get longer net days (Table 8, Columns 5 and 6). 
The evidence thus far is consistent with trade credit as a way to warranty product quality 
– the easier verifiability of the quality of supplies to buyers running high turnover businesses 
                                                            
11 We should be cautious about over-interpreting the effect found for the utility sector because it is based on 
observations from only one firm.   15 
with perishable inputs would justify the short duration credit extended to these businesses, while 
the long time period before cross-border buyers get to use shipped goods justifies the longer 
terms extended to them.
12  
That investment grade suppliers, who presumably have greater access to finance, extend 
longer net days is consistent with the financing explanation. However much of  the evidence 
cannot be reconciled with the financing explanation. We have seen that large, investment grade 
buyers get longer net days, while the financing argument would suggest that smaller, higher 
credit risk buyers should get longer term financing. Also small suppliers tend to offer longer term 
credit, which again is inconsistent with the financing story. These results may be more consistent 
with the market power rationale for trade credit – large, investment grade buyers would typically 
have more power over small suppliers and be able to demand better terms from them.  They are 
also consistent with the warranty rationale – small suppliers may be relatively unknown, and 
have to offer longer term credit to persuade buyers to take their products.  
Finally,  given  some  underlying  rationale  for  extending  credit  (such  as  its  value  as  a 
warranty of product quality) the evidence is also consistent with a risk management explanation. 
Suppliers are willing to trust larger investment grade buyers with longer-term credit because they 
are less likely to default.  
4.2   Buyer-supplier Pairs 
Perhaps we can shed more light on the alternative explanations for trade credit by looking more 
closely at buyer-supplier pairs more carefully, correcting for buyer fixed effects. The financing 
explanation would suggest that large investment grade suppliers should extend longer terms to 
small non-investment grade buyers than should small non-investment grade suppliers. The 
bargaining power explanation would suggest that small suppliers should extend longer terms 
than would large suppliers, especially to large buyers. To the extent that the primary factor 
driving trade credit is its use as a warranty of quality, and to the extent that larger buyers take 
longer to use a product and test its quality, while small suppliers have a greater need to establish 
                                                            
12 It could also be argued that buyers may have to raise the money needed to pay for shipped goods by selling them, 
so they need to be financed until that happens. However, this would not explain why the largest buyers, who 
presumably have the easiest access to financing, get the longest term credit.   16 
product quality, this is another reason why small suppliers should extend longer term credit to 
large buyers.  Finally, whatever the reason suppliers extend credit, small non-investment grade 
suppliers have the least ability to sustain credit losses, and would have the greatest preference for 
mitigating risk by reducing the length of credit, especially to small, non-investment grade buyers. 
Of course, these theories need not be mutually exclusive.  
In Table 9, we explore these possibilities by including buyer fixed effects, and various 
interaction effects in the regression explaining log net days. In column 1, we include interactions 
between the supplier‘s size and the buyer‘s rating. Large- and medium-sized suppliers offer 
significantly shorter terms than small suppliers (the omitted category) to non-investment grade 
buyers, while their terms are longer, but still less than those offered by small suppliers, for 
investment grade buyers.  Thus small suppliers offer relatively the longest duration credit, 
especially to low credit quality buyers. 
In column 2, we see that medium-sized suppliers are significantly less likely than small 
suppliers to extend credit to small buyers, while large-sized suppliers are significantly less likely 
than small suppliers to extend credit to large buyers. Small suppliers seem therefore to extend 
longer credit than larger suppliers, no matter what the size or investment rating of the buyer.  
In column 3, we see that investment grade suppliers offer shorter terms to non-investment 
grade buyers than do non-investment grade suppliers, while they offer longer terms to investment 
grade buyers than do non-investment grade suppliers. Again, it seems that non-investment grade 
suppliers are forced to provide longer terms to less creditworthy buyers.  
In sum,  small  suppliers offer the longest  terms, which is  consistent  with  them being 
squeezed by more powerful  buyers for more credit, or with  them having to  post a stronger 
performance bond. That small, non-investment grade suppliers offer relatively more credit to 
non-investment grade buyers than to investment grade buyers suggests they are forced to extend 
credit to risky buyers, even when suppliers with greater access to finance are not.  
Not all the evidence goes against the financing explanation though. When the supplier is 
investment grade and therefore has greater access to financing, it seems to be willing to lend 
longer, except to non-investment grade buyers. For instance, investment grade suppliers do lend   17 
longer to investment grade buyers than do non-investment grade suppliers (column 3). Also, 
investment grade suppliers offer longer terms to small buyers than do non-investment grade 
suppliers, while the differences narrow for larger buyers (column 4).  
In column 5, we include all the explanatory variables in the previous columns, and while 
the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms are typically smaller, the signs are unchanged.  
We have to recognize the dangers of drawing overly strong conclusions, given that our 
buyers are, for the most part, billion dollar companies. This is likely to be a sample where the 
financing motive for trade credit is least likely to be operative. Nevertheless, it is telling that our 
strongest finding runs against the grain of the financing theory: Even after correcting for buyer 
fixed effects, small suppliers extend the longest credit, even to small, non-investment grade 
buyers. Perhaps then, our sample allows us to highlight the non-financial motives for trade 
credit; the need to offer better terms to powerful buyers, and the need to signal product quality.   
Interestingly, though, given a non-financial motive to extend credit, credit is naturally 
longest when the cost of giving it is low – when the buyer is investment grade and the supplier is 
investment grade.   
4.3  Discounts 
To throw further light on the motivations behind trade credit, we examine the sample of contracts 
that include an early payment discount. The view that discounts are used as a screening 
mechanism to reduce buyer default risk would suggest that smaller and non-investment grade 
buyers, where default risk tends to be higher, would more likely receive discounts. To the extent 
that it is easier for large rated suppliers to diversify or otherwise absorb default risk, this view 
would also suggest that small unrated suppliers are more likely to extend discounts.  
Discounts also allow us to shed more light on the bargaining power explanations. If trade 
credit is a means for large powerful buyers to effectively extract better prices, we should also see 
the following: Because it is costly for small unrated suppliers to extend long term trade credit, 
and because longer term credit is of least value to large rated buyers, who can get financing 
elsewhere, we should see the large buyers translate their bargaining power into shorter terms and 
a discount for early payment.     18 
Finally, to the extent that longer trade credit is a way for the supplier to guarantee product 
quality, we should see small young suppliers, who might suffer the greatest distrust of the quality 
of their product, most reluctant to offer discounts for early payment. Thus the data on early 
payment discounts might shed light on the relative merits of the non-financing explanations. 
We start by charting the average number of contracts with discounts for suppliers and 
buyers of different characteristics. We only consider the 34 buyers who receive at least one 
discount (it may be that the remaining buyers do receive discounts but do not report them, and 
therefore we do not consider the data reliable for them).
13 
Suppliers offer discounts for early payment more frequently to small buyers (Figure 2a 
and 2c) as well as to non-investment grade buyers (Figure 2b and 2d), consistent with the use of 
discounts as a way to mitigate the risk of default. Unlike the predictions of the bargaining power 
theory, however, small suppliers are least likely to offer early discounts to large buyers. Instead, 
they seem to conserve discounts and offer relatively more to small and non-investment grade 
buyers (Figures 2a and 2c). A similar pattern can be seen for non-investment grade suppliers – 
discounts are targeted at riskier buyers.  
                                                            
13 Our main results are robust to the inclusion of these buyers in the model that includes supplier fixed effects and 
adjusts standard errors for clustering at the buyer level. Buyers who never offer discounts are dropped from the 
model that includes buyer fixed effects.   19 
Figure 2: Discount Frequency for Suppliers and Buyers of Different Size and Ratings 
 
These findings suggest a more nuanced view of trade credit and the separate role of 
contractual features such as net days and the discount. It may be that the primary rationale for 
trade credit in our sample is to give buyers the time to ascertain product quality, which is why 
the duration from small unrated suppliers is the longest. At the same time, the cost of offering 
this warranty is highest for small suppliers, especially when they offer it to unrated small buyers. 
As a result, they offer discounts to those buyers to manage the risks down.  
So while large rated buyers may have bargaining power, they seem to exercise it by 
demanding longer ―trial‖ credit periods before they pay.
14 It may seem inefficient for the small 
supplier to extend credit to the large rated buyer. But given that it has to extend credit for non-
financial reasons, it may be constrained efficient for it to use scarce cash resources for 
selectively-targeted discounts that persuade lower credit quality buyers to pay early, thus 
maintaining a high overall quality of its credit portfolio. 
                                                            
14 Antras and Foley (2011) study contracts for one U.S. poultry exporter and find similar evidence that trade 































































Figure 2c  20 
We turn next to regression analysis. In Table 10, we present logit regressions of 
determinants of early payment discounts for the subsample of contracts that offer early payment 
discounts. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the contract includes a discount (two-part 
contract), and 0 otherwise. We focus on the regressions for buyers who have at least one discount 
(columns 2, 3, and 5), though for completeness, we also present regression results for the 
complete sample of buyers (in columns 1 and 4).  
Let us focus first on the regression estimates with supplier fixed effects in column 5. 
Large buyers get significantly fewer contracts with discounts, and investment grade buyers are 
also less likely to get discounts for early payment.  Discounts also tend to be industry-specific, 
with discounts being more common for buyers in the groceries sector, where goods tend to be 
perishable. These findings are consistent with the theory that trade credit is a way to guaranty 
product quality. Turning next to the estimates with buyer fixed effects in column 3, we find that 
large and medium-sized suppliers give significantly fewer discounts than small suppliers. 
That early payment discounts are more common from small suppliers is consistent with 
the market power hypothesis, except that these discounts go more to small and non-investment 
grade buyers.  The finding is more consistent with the risk management view that stipulates that 
smaller suppliers are more likely to offer discounts to risky buyers as a way to encourage early 
payment and prevent default because it is more difficult for these firms to absorb and diversify 
default risk.
15 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
The bilateral, multi-contract nature of our dataset is truly unique and is a major improvement on 
(generally survey based) datasets that have previously been used to study the determinants of 
credit terms used in trade credit. This multi-contract structure of our dataset allows us to abstract 
from unobserved buyer and supplier firm characteristics, something previous empirical work has 
not been able to do. 
                                                            
15 We could also examine buyer-seller pairs as in Table 9, but the smaller number of observations on discounts 
renders much of the analysis statistically inconclusive. 
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We find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest 
maturities, as measured by net days, from smaller suppliers. This is consistent with a market 
power explanation (smaller suppliers are squeezed more by large buyers) as well as the view that 
credit may be a means for small suppliers to warranty quality to their large buyers. However, if 
the buyer‘s bargaining power is the primary rationale for trade credit, it is puzzling that the large 
rated buyers do not swap the credit (which the supplier can ill afford and the buyer does not 
need) for a discount. Instead, it is the small unrated buyer who typically gets the discount. One 
explanation is that there may be non-financial intrinsic value in trade credit – for example as a 
warranty of product quality – that is lost when the buyer is offered and takes a discount. 
Nevertheless, trade credit discounts may still be offered to the riskiest buyers in order to reduce 
the overall risk of the supplier‘s credit portfolio, and achieve an optimal mix of warranty and risk. 
Clearly, more work is needed to put these conjectures on firmer footing. Nevertheless, 
our work provides more evidence that the motivations for trade credit are both intriguing and 
suggestive of the richness of financial contracting.  
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Table 1:  Buyer and Seller Characteristics 
  
This table reports summary statistics of buyer, supplier, and contract characteristics. Sample consists of 29,019 trade 
credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. Early payment discounts are offered on 3,717 of 
these contracts. The effective interest rate variable is winsorized at 100%. 
 
Panel A: Buyer Characteristics (Percentages) 
 











% of total 
amount 
             
Size >$10 billion  33  59  24,298  84  612  89 
Size $0.1— 10 billion  23  41  4,721  16  79  11 
             
Industry auto   9  16  1,615  6  75.8  11 
Industry diversified retail  7  13  9,749  34  193  28 
Industry diversified mfg  16  29  3,824  13  74.3  11 
Industry grocery  4  7  1,630  6  88.5  13 
Industry hard goods retail  9  16  3,146  11  164  24 
Industry soft goods retail  6  11  2,362  8  42.1  6 
Industry technology  3  5  5,306  18  24.2  4 
Industry food & beverages  2  4  682  2  26.7  4 
Industry utility  1  2  705  2  2.47  0 
             
Location: Europe  13  23  12,029  41  241  35 
Location: North America  43  77  16,990  59  450  65 
             
Investment Grade: No  14  25  4,008  14  107  16 
Investment Grade: Yes  42  75  25,011  86  583  84 




Panel B: Supplier Characteristics (Percentages) 
 














             
Size >$2 billion  2,727  11  5,772  20  531  77 
Size $0.1—2 billion  7,821  32  9,549  33  142  21 
Size <$0.1 billion  13,590  56  13,698  47  17.9  3 
             
Investment Grade: No  16,391  68  18,655  65  319  46 
Investment Grade: Yes  7,713  32  10,043  35  372  54 
 
     1 
 
Panel C: Contract Characteristics 
 
   N  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std Dev 
Contract amount (US$ million)  29,019  23.8  3.47  .0004  6,520.0  111.0 
Net Days  29,019  59.2  60  1  120  26.1 
             
Discount offered (%)  3,717  0.13  0  0  1   
   Discount Days  3,462  30.43  30  1  180  20.09 
   Discount Rate (%)  3,707  2  2  .02  11.5  0.09 
   Ratio of Discount to Net Days  2,634  0.63  0.6  0.02  1  0.28 
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Table 2:  Buyer and Seller Cross-Tabulations 
 
This table reports cross-tabulations of count statistics of buyer and supplier characteristics (Panel A) and within 
buyer characteristics (Panel B). Sample consists of 29,019 trade credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 
suppliers. Not investment grade also includes unrated firms. 
 
Panel A: Buyer vs. Supplier Characteristics (number of observations) 
 
  Supplier Size    Supplier 
Investment Grade 
   
  Small  Medium  Large    No  Yes    Total 
Buyer Size                 
Small/Medium  1,608  2,166  947    3,471  1,250    4,721 
Large  12,090  7,383  4,825    15,505  8,793    24,298 
                 
Buyer Investment Grade                 
No  1,204  1,729  1,075    2,667  1,341    4,008 
Yes  12,494  7,820  4,697    16,309  8,702    25,011 
                 
Total  13,698  9,549  5,772    18,976  10,043    29,019 
 
 
Panel B: Buyer Characteristics (number of buyers) 
 
  Buyer size     
  Small /Medium  Large    Total 
Buyer Investment Grade 
     
 
 
No  6  8    14 
Yes  17  25    42 
         
Total  23  33    56 
   3 
Table 3:  Distribution of Buyer and Seller Characteristics, by Contract Characteristics (Percentages) 
 
This table reports the distribution (in percentages) of trade credit contract terms by buyer and supplier characteristics. Sample consists of 29,019 trade credit 
contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. NA denotes North America. 
 
  Contract Amount (%)  Net Days (%)  Location 
  < $1M  $1-4M  $4-15M  > $15M  0-30  31-60  61-90  91+  Europe  NA 
Buyer Characteristics: 
                     
Size >$10 billion  32  23  20  25  20  38  29  13  46  54 
Size $0.1- 10 billion  5  35  33  26  52  40  8  0  18  82 
                     
Industry auto  0  15  28  57  20  53  20  7  59  41 
Industry diversified retail  23  37  22  17  10  13  50  26  84  16 
Industry diversified mfg  6  29  36  29  47  34  17  1  0  100 
Industry grocery  11  25  18  47  42  54  3  0  84  16 
Industry hard goods retail  0  15  29  57  21  52  24  4  3  97 
Industry soft goods retail  26  23  22  29  85  14  1  1  0  100 
Industry technology  74  9  10  7  8  88  3  0  0  100 
Industry food & beverage  28  34  21  17  27  30  12  31  100  0 
Industry utility  73  18  6  4  54  9  36  0  100  0 
                     
Location: Europe  26  33  20  20  11  19  46  23  100  0 
Location: North America  29  19  23  29  37  53  10  1  0  100 
                     
Investment Grade: No  20  20  28  32  68  29  2  0  7  93 
Investment Grade: Yes  29  26  21  24  18  39  28  12  50  50 
 
Supplier Characteristics: 
                     
Size: >$2 billion  5  11  18  65  33  39  21  8  30  70 
Size: $0.1-2 billion  5  9  48  38  34  32  24  11  39  61 
Size: <$0.1 billion  53  41  6  0  18  43  27  12  48  52 
                     
Investment Grade: No  28  26  23  23  27  40  24  10  43  57 
Investment Grade: Yes  27  22  21  30  23  37  27  12  41  59   4 
Table 4:  Distribution of Buyer and Seller Characteristics,  
by Discount Characteristics (Percentages) 
 
This table reports the distribution of trade credit contract terms (in percentages) by buyer and supplier characteristics for the subsample of 3,717 contracts that 
offer an early payment discount. Statistics are not reported for the technology, food & beverages, and utility industries, as no buyers in these industries are 
offered discounts. 
 
  Full Sample 
Subsample of Contracts that Offer an Early Payment Discount 
Discount Rate (%)  Discount Days (%)  Discount to Net 
Days Ratio (%)    Discount (%)  0-1%  1-2%  > 2%  0-30  31-60  61+ 
Buyer Characteristics: 
Size >$10 billion  10  35  58  7  64  33  3  64 
Size $0.1- 10 billion  26  37  52  11  78  21  2  60 
                 
Industry auto  19  21  50  29  100  0  0  35 
Industry diversified retail  5  34  66  0  94  5  1  43 
Industry diversified mfg  13  67  30  3  95  4  1  44 
Industry grocery  25  31  48  22  84  15  0  87 
Industry hard goods retail  58  35  60  5  54  42  4  68 
Industry soft goods retail  8  5  86  9  25  75  0  95 
                 
Location: Europe  4  19  44  37  70  28  2  80 
Location: North America  19  38  58  4  67  30  3  61 
                 
Investment Grade: No  17  42  57  1  93  6  1  53 
Investment Grade: Yes  12  34  56  10  57  32  2  66 
 
Supplier Characteristics: 
Size >$2 billion  27  34  58  7  66  31  3  65 
Size $0.1-2 billion  17  38  54  8  67  30  2  63 
Size <$0.1 billion  4  32  58  11  80  19  1  57 
                 
Investment Grade: No  13  37  55  9  69  29  2  63 
Investment Grade: Yes  12  33  59  7  67  30  3  64 
   5 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the main regression variables. Sample consists of 29,019 trade 
credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. Early payment discounts are offered on 
3,717 of these contracts. 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Complete sample:           
Log net days  28,187  3.947  0.614  0  5.481 
Discount dummy  29,019  0.128  0.334  0  1 
           
Subsample of contracts with early payment discount:           
Discount days  3,462  30.433  20.09  1  180 
Discount rate  3,707  0.017  0.008  0.000  0.115 
Discount days/Net days  2,634  0.630  0.282  0.017  1 
Effective rate  2,584  0.533  0.381  0.017  1 
           
Buyer characteristics:           
Buyer large size  29,019  0.837  0.369  0  1 
Buyer small size  29,019  0.163  0.369  0  1 
Buyer investment grade  29,019  0.862  0.345  0  1 
Buyer North America  29,019  0.586  0.493  0  1 
Industry auto  29,019  0.056  0.229  0  1 
Industry diversified retail  29,019  0.336  0.472  0  1 
Industry diversified mfg  29,019  0.132  0.338  0  1 
Industry grocery  29,019  0.056  0.230  0  1 
Industry hard goods retail  29,019  0.108  0.311  0  1 
Industry soft goods retail  29,019  0.081  0.273  0  1 
Industry technology  29,019  0.183  0.387  0  1 
Industry food and beverages  29,019  0.024  0.152  0  1 
Industry utility  29,019  0.024  0.154  0  1 
           
Supplier characteristics:           
Supplier large size  29,019  0.199  0.399  0  1 
Supplier medium size  29,019  0.329  0.470  0  1 
Supplier small size  29,019  0.472  0.499  0  1 
Supplier investment grade  29,019  0.346  0.476  0  1 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
This table reports correlations between the main regression variables. Panel A presents correlations 
between the explanatory and dependent variables. Panel B presents correlations between the explanatory 
variables. Sample consists of 29,019 trade credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. 
Early payment discounts are offered on 3,717 of these contracts. 
 
Panel A : Correlations between credit terms, buyer characterstics, and supplier characteristics 
  Full Sample  Subsample w/Discount 








         
Buyer large size  0.26*  -0.18*  0.09*  0.01 
Buyer small size  -0.26*  0.18*  -0.09*  -0.02 
Buyer investment grade  0.29*  -0.05*  0.20*  0.15* 
Buyer North America  -0.37*  0.22*  -0.18*  -0.26* 
Industry auto  0.00  0.04*  -0.17*  -0.12* 
Industry diversified retail  0.35*  -0.17*  -0.33*  -0.27* 
Industry diversified mfg  -0.13*  0.00  -0.32*  -0.26* 
Industry grocery  -0.17*  0.09*  0.35*  0.44* 
Industry hard goods retail  -0.01  0.47*  0.15*  -0.03 
Industry soft goods retail  -0.25*  -0.04*  0.33*  0.34* 
Industry technology  -0.02*  -0.18*  n.a.  n.a. 
Industry food and beverage  0.05*  -0.06*  n.a.  n.a. 
Industry utility  -0.07*  -0.06*  n.a.  n.a. 
Supplier large size  -0.11*  0.21*  0.06*  0.08* 
Supplier medium size  -0.10*  0.08*  0.00  -0.05 
Supplier small size  0.18*  -0.25*  -0.08*  -0.04 
Supplier investment grade  0.03*  -0.02*  0.02  0.02 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 1% 
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Buyer investment grade  0.02*     
 
                   
Buyer North America  -0.21*  -0.28*   
 
                   
Industry auto  -0.15*  -0.12*  -0.08*   
                   
Industry diversified retail  0.17*  0.15*  -0.62*  -0.17*                     
Industry diversified mfg  -0.38*  -0.09*  0.33*  -0.09*  -0.28*                   
Industry grocery  0.11*  -0.01  -0.21*  -0.06*  -0.06*  -0.23*                 
Industry hard goods retail  -0.03*  0.11*  0.27*  -0.08*  -0.25*  -0.14*  -0.09*               
Industry soft goods retail  -0.07*  -0.35*  0.25*  -0.07*  -0.21*  -0.12*  -0.07*  -0.10*             
Industry technology  0.21*  0.13*  0.40*  -0.11*  -0.34*  -0.18*  -0.12*  -0.16*  -0.14*           
Industry food and beverage  -0.03*  -0.05*  -0.18*  -0.04*  -0.11*  -0.06*  -0.04*  -0.05*  -0.05*  -0.07*         
Industry utility  0.07*  0.06*  -0.19*  -0.04*  -0.11*  -0.06*  -0.04*  -0.06*  -0.05*  -0.07*  -0.02*       
Supplier large size  -0.00  -0.07*  0.12*  0.07*  -0.10*  0.03*  0.10*  0.23*  -0.03*  -0.15*  0.00  -0.06*     
Supplier medium size  -0.12*  -0.09*  0.04*  0.11*  -0.05*  0.13*  0.01  0.10*  0.04*  -0.20*  -0.01  -0.07*  -0.35*   
Supplier investment grade  0.08*  0.01  -0.02*  0.02*  0.02*  -0.03*  -0.02*  0.02*  -0.05*  0.03*  -0.02*  0.00  0.22*  -0.11* 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 1% 
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Table 7: Variance Decomposition 
 
This table shows the results of an ANOVA analysis of variance. Specifically, we report the contribution of 
buyer and supplier characteristics in explaining the variance of contract characteristics. Panel A includes 
supplier specific variables, while panel B shows results of an ANOVA analysis of variance for the subset of 
contracts from suppliers with multiple buyers when including supplier fixed effects.  
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 




Effective Interest Rate 
 
   
Source  Dof 
sum of 
squares  f-stat.  p-value 
Contribution to 
SST (%) 
           
Buyer's size  1  723250.1  2115.81  0.000  3.80 
Buyer's sub-industry  8  2715169.2  992.88  0.000  14.28 
Buyer's location  3  849004.4  827.90  0.000  4.47 
Buyer's investment grade  1  399902.6  1169.88  0.000  2.10 
Supplier's size  2  28199.4  41.25  0.000  0.15 
Supplier's investment grade  1  3394.8  9.93  0.002  0.02 
           
Number of obs =   28,187           
Adj R-squared =  0.494           
Source  dof 
sum of 
squares  f-stat.  p-value 
Contribution to 
SST (%) 
           
Buyer's size  1  0.054  1.25  0.264  0.03 
Buyer's sub-industry  5  76.411  355.54  0.000  36.63 
Buyer's location  2  7.223  84.02  0.000  3.46 
Buyer's investment grade  1  1.477  34.35  0.000  0.71 
Supplier's size  2  0.208  2.41  0.090  0.10 
Supplier's investment grade  1  0.004  0.09  0.768  0.00 
           
Number of obs =   2,634           
Adj R-squared =  0.458           
Source  Dof 
sum of 
squares  f-stat.  p-value 
Contribution to 
SST (%) 
           
Buyer's size  1  0.360  0.36  0.549  0.02 
Buyer's sub-industry  5  13.343  2.66  0.021  0.72 
Buyer's location  2  3.195  1.59  0.204  0.17 
Buyer's investment grade  1  0.812  0.81  0.368  0.04 
Supplier's size  2  1.244  0.62  0.538  0.07 
Supplier's investment grade  1  1.906  1.90  0.168  0.10 
           
Number of obs =   1,680           
Adj R-squared =  0.095             9 
Panel B: Supplier fixed effects 
 




Effective Interest Rate 
Source  dof 
sum of 
squares  f-stat.  p-value 
Contribution to 
SST (%) 
           
Buyer's size  1  51833.9  173.66  0.000  0.99 
Buyer's sub-industry  8  146110.9  61.19  0.000  2.80 
Buyer's location  3  71845.8  80.24  0.000  1.38 
Buyer's investment grade  1  68343.5  228.97  0.000  1.31 
Supplier fixed effect  2266  1435193.1  2.12  0.000  27.51 
           
Number of obs =   6,448           
Adj R-squared =  0.631           
Source  dof 
sum of 
squares  f-stat.  p-value 
Contribution to 
SST (%) 
           
Buyer's size  1  0.018  0.57  0.450  0.02 
Buyer's sub-industry  5  4.677  29.80  0.000  5.51 
Buyer's location  2  2.907  46.32  0.000  3.43 
Buyer's investment grade  1  0.790  25.17  0.000  0.93 
Supplier fixed effect  540  32.409  1.91  0.000  38.20 
           
Number of obs =   1,051           
Adj R-squared =  0.612           
 
Source  dof 
sum of 
squares  f-stat.  p-value 
Contribution to 
SST (%) 
           
Buyer's size  1  0.414  4.30  0.039  0.03 
Buyer's sub-industry  4  0.646  1.68  0.155  0.04 
Buyer's location  2  0.237  1.23  0.293  0.01 
Buyer's investment grade  1  0.660  6.86  0.009  0.04 
Supplier fixed effect  371  1445.123  40.46  0.000  89.81 
           
Number of obs =   678           
Adj R-squared =  0.960             10 
Table 8: Net Days 
Dependent variable is the logarithm of net days on the contract. Standard errors in regressions (1) and (2) are 
corrected for clustering at the buyer level. Regressions (3) and (4) include buyer fixed effects. Regressions (5) and 
(6) include supplier fixed effects and are estimated based on the subsample of suppliers that have multiple contracts. 
Regressions (2), (4) and (6) include only trade credit contracts with no discounts. Standard errors are reported 
between brackets.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: Log 
net days  Buyer clustered  Buyer FE  Supplier FE 
             
    Without 
discount 
  Without 
discount 
  Without 
discount 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Buyer large size  0.387***  0.388***      0.225***  0.172*** 
  (0.102)  (0.110)      (0.025)  (0.031) 
Buyer investment grade  0.238**  0.293***      0.226***  0.280*** 
  (0.105)  (0.113)      (0.025)  (0.030) 
Buyer North America  -0.488***  -0.556***      -0.443***  -0.499*** 
  (0.168)  (0.184)      (0.043)  (0.054) 
Industry diversified retail  -0.071  -0.136      0.036  -0.067 
  (0.127)  (0.155)      (0.060)  (0.071) 
Industry diversified mfg  0.095  0.124      0.181***  0.169*** 
  (0.166)  (0.186)      (0.052)  (0.060) 
Industry grocery  -0.763***  -0.760***      -0.534***  -0.535*** 
  (0.136)  (0.163)      (0.069)  (0.084) 
Industry hard goods retail  0.134  0.110      0.067  -0.001 
  (0.150)  (0.166)      (0.061)  (0.073) 
Industry soft goods retail  -0.262*  -0.230      -0.125  -0.103 
  (0.143)  (0.161)      (0.086)  (0.097) 
Industry technology  -0.048  -0.044      -0.237***  -0.287*** 
  (0.304)  (0.321)      (0.062)  (0.069) 
Industry food and beverage  -0.148  -0.200      0.100  0.043 
  (0.143)  (0.158)      (0.131)  (0.141) 
Industry utility  -0.805***  -0.872***      -0.552***  -0.661*** 
  (0.122)  (0.156)      (0.119)  (0.128) 
Supplier small size  0.149  0.145  0.059***  0.068***     
  (0.126)  (0.138)  (0.008)  (0.008)     
Supplier medium size  0.009  -0.011  0.018**  0.022***     
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.007)  (0.008)     
Supplier investment grade  0.008  0.006  0.017***  0.017***     
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.005)     
             
Number of buyers  56  56  56  56  56  56 
Number of suppliers  24,006  22,028  24,006  22,028  2,267  2,051 
Number of observations  28,187  25,298  28,187  25,298  6,448  5,321 
R-squared  0.336  0.334  0.036  0.030  0.274  0.284 
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Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects of Buyer and Supplier Characteristics 
 
In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is log net days and regression estimates are based on an OLS model with 
buyer fixed effects. In columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that take a value of one if the 
trade credit contract includes a discount (two-part contract), and zero otherwise, and regression estimates are based 
on a logit model with buyer fixed effects. All columns include buyer fixed effects. Standard errors are reported 
between brackets.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 










Supplier large size  -0.128***  0.007  -0.058***  -0.061***  -0.056** 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.026) 
Supplier medium size  -0.060***  -0.048***  -0.042***  -0.042***  -0.070*** 
  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.022) 
Supplier invst grade  0.017***  0.016***  -0.028**  0.047***  -0.006 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
Supplier large size * Buyer invst grade  0.082***        0.072*** 
  (0.022)        (0.022) 
Supplier medium size * Buyer invst grade  0.020        0.020 
  (0.019)        (0.019) 
Supplier large size * Buyer large size    -0.084***      -0.079*** 
    (0.019)      (0.021) 
Supplier medium size * Buyer large size    0.009      0.012 
    (0.016)      (0.017) 
Supplier invst grade * Buyer invst grade      0.053***    0.038** 
      (0.014)    (0.015) 
Supplier invst grade * Buyer large size        -0.035**  -0.012 
        (0.014)  (0.015) 
           
No. of buyers  56  56  56  56  56 
No. of observations  28,187  28,187  28,187  28,187  28,187 
R-squared  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.004 
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Table 10: Discounts 
 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that take a value of one if the trade credit contract includes a discount (two-
part contract), and zero otherwise. Regression estimates are based on a logit model. Standard errors in regressions 
(1) through (2) are corrected for clustering at the buyer level. Regression (3) includes buyer fixed effects (note that 
by definition, this sample is equivalent to the sample of buyers who have at least one discount). Regressions (4) and 
(5) include supplier fixed effects and are estimated based on the subsample of suppliers that have multiple contracts. 
Regressions (2) and (5) only include buyers who have at least one discount. Several industries do not have firms 
with discounts and are dropped from estimation. Standard errors are reported between brackets. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 




have at least 
one discount      
Buyers who 
have at least 
one discount 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Buyer large size  -1.587**  -0.738    -1.673***  -1.313*** 
  (0.698)  (0.504)    (0.179)  (0.199) 
Buyer investment grade  -0.546  -0.568    -0.779***  -0.835*** 
  (0.681)  (0.684)    (0.174)  (0.214) 
Buyer North America  1.753  0.839    3.365***  3.667*** 
  (1.270)  (1.079)    (0.386)  (0.527) 
Industry diversified retail  0.929  -0.790    2.504***  0.647 
  (1.428)  (1.042)    (0.419)  (0.516) 
Industry diversified mfg  -0.005  -1.706*    -0.148  -1.442*** 
  (1.097)  (0.947)    (0.336)  (0.464) 
Industry grocery  3.189*  -0.152    5.632***  3.373*** 
  (1.657)  (1.129)    (0.559)  (0.710) 
Industry hard goods retail  2.937***  0.472    3.838***  1.644*** 
  (0.963)  (1.061)    (0.387)  (0.484) 
Industry soft goods retail  -0.068  -1.364    0.647  -0.466 
  (1.130)  (1.033)    (0.753)  (0.862) 
Supplier small size  -1.215***  -0.601  0.225**     
  (0.344)  (0.419)  (0.095)     
Supplier medium size  -0.466***  -0.409**  -0.098     
  (0.158)  (0.175)  (0.066)     
Supplier investment grade  -0.280***  -0.099  -0.065     
  (0.093)  (0.107)  (0.064)     
           
Number of buyers  56  34  34  56  34 
Number of suppliers  24,140  7,927  7,927  399  305 
Number of observations  29,019  10,604  10,604  2,067  1,433 
Pseudo R-squared  0.336  0.118  0.002  0.295  0.150 
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Appendix. Interest Rates and Other Contract Terms 
 
For completeness, we analyze the determinants of discount terms for the subsample of 
contracts that offer early payment discounts and for which we have complete information on 
discount terms (including discount period, discount rate, and net days). Specifically, we analyze 
the effective interest rate and the ratio of discount days to net days. The regression results are 
presented in Table A1 and are based on the subsample of contracts that offer early payment 
discounts. In order to compute the effective interest rate we also restrict the sample to firms 
whose discount days are more than one day shorter than net days.  Columns 1 to 3 present the 
interest rate regression results, where we regress our buyer and supplier characteristics on 
effective interest rate, defined as   1 ) 1 ( 1
) /( 360  
 days discount days net rate discount , while Columns 4 
to 6 present the regression results with the ratio of discount days/net days as dependent variable.  
These results are not materially affected when we include firms with incomplete information on 
discount terms.  
Discount terms appear to be dependent on industry norms. For instance, buyers of soft 
goods and groceries tend to receive the longest discount day ratio. The same industries also 
receive the highest effective rates on two-part contracts, according to the regression in column 1 
where standard errors as clustered at the buyer level. As mentioned earlier, a surprisingly large 
fraction of contracts (over 30%) with early payment discounts have a spread between net days 
and discount days of exactly one day, suggesting that discounts are often used to encourage 
prompt payments. As goods in the grocery and the soft goods retail sectors are often perishable, 
these findings are consistent with the theory that trade credit is a means to warranty quality. 
In unreported regressions, we generally find similar patterns across discount terms 
(including discount period and discount rate) in the sense that the coefficients on the various firm   14 
determinants have the same sign in most specifications, suggesting that the different discount 
terms serve similar purposes and that firms do not systematically trade off various terms against 
each other. This is consistent with the findings by Ng et al. (1999). 
  
Table A1: Discount Terms 
 
Dependent variable is the effective interest rate on the trade credit contract in columns (1) to (3) and the ratio of 
discount days to net days in columns (4) to (6). Sample in the interest rate regressions in columns (1) to (3) removes 
outliers by excluding contracts where the spread between net days and discount days is one day or less. Standard 
errors in regression (1) and (4) are corrected for clustering at the buyer level. Regressions (2) and (5) include buyer 
fixed effects (note that by definition, this sample is equivalent to the sample of buyers excluding discounts). 
Regressions (3) and (6) include supplier fixed effects and are estimated based on the subsample of suppliers that 
have multiple contracts. Several industries do not have firms with discounts and are dropped from the regressions. 
We also exclude contracts with missing discount or net days information from the regressions. Standard errors are 
reported between brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Effective interest rate 
 
Discount days/Net days 
Buyer 
clustered 




Buyer FE  Supplier FE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Buyer large size  -0.059    0.022  0.012    0.020 
  (0.093)    (0.033)  (0.110)    (0.030) 
Buyer investment grade  0.071*    0.163***  0.087*    0.160*** 
  (0.041)    (0.034)  (0.049)    (0.035) 
Buyer North America  0.042    -0.521**  0.225***    0.388*** 
  (0.098)    (0.209)  (0.048)    (0.079) 
Industry diversified retail  0.018    -0.066  0.075    -0.156 
  (0.071)    (0.088)  (0.058)    (0.102) 
Industry diversified mfg  -0.056    -0.026  0.047    -0.073 
  (0.086)    (0.077)  (0.072)    (0.092) 
Industry grocery  0.349***    -0.627**  0.613***    0.303*** 
  (0.123)    (0.254)  (0.057)    (0.106) 
Industry hard goods retail  -0.049    -0.224***  0.269***    -0.153 
  (0.095)    (0.087)  (0.095)    (0.100) 
Industry soft goods retail  0.455***      0.538***    0.324* 
  (0.107)      (0.068)    (0.177) 
Supplier Small size  0.011  -0.041***    0.017  -0.010   
  (0.040)  (0.015)    (0.030)  (0.013)   
Supplier medium size  -0.034**  -0.037***    -0.009  0.001   
  (0.014)  (0.010)    (0.013)  (0.009)   
Supplier investment grade  0.010  0.002    0.004  0.001   
  (0.016)  (0.010)    (0.016)  (0.009)   
             
Number of buyers  33  33  26  34  34  28 
Number of suppliers  1,375  1,375  372  2,080  2,080  541 
Number of observations  1,681  1,681  678  2,634  2,634  1,051 
R-squared  0.155  0.011  0.108  0.441  0.006  0.258 
 